Aviation Accident Law News-NTSB Current NTSB Safety Recommendations

The NTSB has investigated more than 110,000 aircraft accidents since it began in 1967. The NTSB was created to investigate every civil aviation accident in the U.S., as well as to issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. Now one of the world’s leading accident investigation agencies, the NTSB has issued more than 11,600 recommendations to more than 2,200 recipients. The most recent NTSB aviation safety recommendations include:

propeller blades
in-flight fires
omission in pilot training

NTSB director, Clark Rupp, thinks that airline safety is going to come slowly in “small increments”.

Propeller Blade

January 12, 2002, a Hamilton Sundstrand

568E propeller blade separated adjacent to the propeller hub on the right engine of an Anions de Transport Regional airplane. Shortly after takeoff the pilots felt high vibrations in the airplane as the right engine’s low oil pressure warning light illuminated. The fuel lever jammed when the pilots tried to show down the engine and they had to emergency land, leaving minor damage to the airplane.

Require Hamilton Sundstrand to perform additional analytical examinations and testing, including removal of the compression wrap so that the tulip can be fully examined, of a

sample of high service-time 568F propeller blades with serial numbers 1,699 or greater to determine if rust and corrosion pitting are occurring in the fillet radius, and, on the basis

of the results of those examinations, require additional inspections, modifications, or repairs as appropriate.

For all Hamilton Sundstrand 568F propeller blades with serial numbers 1 through 1,698:

(1) Require the immediate inspection and repair (including removal of the compression wrap and any existing corrosion, a nondestructive inspection for cracks, shot peening of the radius, and installation of an appropriate corrosion protection system) of all blades that have been in service more than 6 years or 11,700 hours; (2) Immediately determine a conservative threshold for the inspection and repair of the remaining blades that is

appropriately less than 6 years or 11,700 hours in service, taking into account the uncertainties in the failure mechanism (including the initiation and growth rate for the pitting and fatigue cracking); (3) Require the immediate inspection and repair of those

propeller blades that have already reached or exceeded the threshold determined as a result of (2), above; and (4) For those propeller blades that are not immediately inspected and repaired in accordance with (1) and (3), above, require that they be inspected and repaired as soon as possible, but no later than the threshold determined as a result of (2), above. (Urgent)

To read the NTSB Safety Recommendation letter regarding Propeller Blades from February 12, 2002, click here.

Due to investigations on in-flight fires there were various aviation safety recommendations made.

November 29, 2000, an American Airlines operated DC-9-82 was struck by lightning and had an in-flight fire that forced an emergency landing and evacuation, leaving minor damages. August 8, 2000, an Air Tran Airways operated DC-9-32 had to emergency land after an in-flight fire started, resulting in minor injuries and smoke inhalation. September 17, 1999, a Delta Air Lines operated McDonnell Douglas MD-88 made an emergency landing and evacuation after an in-flight fire started, leading to minor damage. June 2, 1983, an Air Canada operated DC-9 made an emergency landing and evacuation due to an in-flight fire, detected by a passenger. The fire caused 23 passengers to become trapped in the aircraft to their deaths, and the airplane was completely destroyed.

-Issue an advisory circular (AC) that describes the need for crewmembers to take immediate and aggressive action in response to signs of an in-flight fire. The AC should stress that fires often are hidden behind interior panels and therefore may require a crewmember to remove or otherwise gain access to the area behind interior panels in order to effectively apply extinguishing agents to the source of the fire.

-Develop and require implementation of procedures or airplane modifications that will provide the most effective means for crewmembers to gain access to areas behind interior

panels for the purpose of applying extinguishing agent to hidden fires. As part of this effort, the FAA should evaluate the feasibility of equipping interior panels of new and

existing airplanes with ports, access panels, or some other means to apply extinguishing agent behind interior panels.

-Require principal operations inspectors to ensure that the contents of the advisory circular (recommended in A-01-83) are incorporated into crewmember training programs.

-Issue a flight standards handbook bulletin to principal operations inspectors to ensure that air carrier training programs explain the properties of Halon and emphasize that the potential harmful effects on passengers and crew are negligible compared to the safety benefits achieved by fighting in-flight fires aggressively.

-Amend 14 Code of Federal Regulations 121.417 to require participation in firefighting drills that involve actual or simulated fires during crewmember recurrent training

and to require that those drills include realistic scenarios on recognizing potential signs of, locating, and fighting hidden fires.

To read the NTSB Safety Recommendation letter regarding In-Flight Fires from January 4, 2002,
click here.

There are a couple recommendations made in response to industry-wide safety issues that involved the omission in pilot training on transport-category airplanes. The NTSB has found that many pilot training programs do not include information about structural certification requirements for the rudder and vertical stabilizer on transport-category airplanes. Even at speed below the design maneuvering speed, the NTSB found that sequential full opposite rudder inputs may result in structural loads exceeding what is addressed in the requirements. Some airplane pilots may think that the rudder limiter systems installed on most transport-category airplanes that limit rudder input from overloading the structure prevent sequential full opposite rudder deflections from damaging the structure. Structural certification requirements for transport-category airplanes do not take maneuvers into account and the sequential opposite rudder inputs can produce loads higher than required for certification and exceed structural capabilities of the airplane.

November 12, 2001, an American Airlines flight was destroyed after crashing into a residential area following takeoff. Prior to the impact, the vertical stabilizer and rudder separated from the fuselage, leaving the 2 pilots, 7 flight attendants, 251 passengers, and 5 people on the ground dead.

-Carefully review all existing and proposed guidance and training provided to pilots of transport-category airplanes concerning special maneuvers intended to address unusual or emergency situations and, if necessary, require modifications to ensure that flight crews are not trained to use the rudder in a way that could result in dangerous combinations of sideslip angle and rudder position or other flight parameters.

-Require the manufacturers and operators of transport-category airplanes to establish and implement pilot training programs that: (1) explain the structural certification requirements for the rudder and vertical stabilizer on transport-category airplanes; (2) explain that a full or nearly full rudder deflection in one direction followed by a full or nearly full rudder deflection in the opposite direction, or certain combinations of sideslip angle and opposite rudder deflection can result in potentially dangerous loads on the vertical stabilizer, even at speeds below the design maneuvering speed; and (3) explain that, on some aircraft, as speed increases, the maximum available rudder deflection can be obtained with comparatively light pedal forces and small pedal deflections. The FAA should also require revisions to airplane and pilot operating manuals that reflect and reinforce this information. In addition, the FAA should ensure that this training does not compromise the substance or effectiveness of existing training regarding proper rudder use, such as during engine failure shortly after takeoff or during strong or gusty crosswind takeoffs or landings.

To read the NTSB Safety Recommendation letter regarding Omission in Pilot Training from February 8, 2002, click here.